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World War II, followed by the post-war expansion of communis m, was one of the major 
disasters the world struggled with in the last century.1 It constituted a particular social, polit ical, 
economic and military dimension for nations which the ideology was imposed on, and Poland was one 
of them. Stalin used the war with precision to create the communist empire. Relying on unprecedented 
terror, tested in his homeland, he aimed at the global revolution, which he partly managed to conduct. 
Weakness, naivety and perhaps cynicism of Western powers, which disregarded the provisions of  
the Atlantic Charter and accepted Stalin's accomplished fact policy, helped him. 2 Despite their 
declarations, the Tehran and Yalta resolutions of the Big Three, and the zones of influence which were 
consequently established, complemented contempt for interests of weak allies.3 The Soviet regime 
driven by its war successes had in fact a decisive effect on the shape of post -war Europe and the world, 
remain ing one of its key moderators. Ironically, owing to Stalin's propaganda, the model of a socialist 
state such as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was perceived as moderately positive in many 
Western societies. Nothing wrong was noticed, or there was no intention of noticing anything wrong, 
which could bring pangs of conscience in the Western powers in connection with their former allies. 
As a result, the situation was just as Franklin Delano Roosevelt predicted in 1943, when he said that 
„(...) in the territory they occupy, the Soviets will do more or less what they please”.4 And they did do 
and they did a lot. Time told what this Soviet socialism, with slogans covering criminal communist 
ideology in its Soviet edition, was like; early post-war years in particular. Becoming more and more 
hermet ic, Churchill's „steel curtain” detached nations incapacitated by the USSR from western  thought 
and culture for dozens of years; barring their development in this way. The flush of sovietisation which 
covered the Eastern and Central Europe introducing „dummy” national governments - which in fact 
were y ield ing to the Soviet dictatorship - swept at the same time everything that did not match  
the Soviet model of state, and actually everything that constituted an obstacle in introducing and 
strengthening this model. In this manner Stalin's plan imposing the Soviet way of thinking on satellite  
nations was being implemented, and by no means was it consciously chosen by these nations.5  
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1
 In 2015 Nowy ład Stalina. Sowietyzacja Europy 1945–1953, a book by Nikita PIETROV, was published.  
The work reveals mechanism of introducing and strengthening communism in countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe, also referring to territorial changes which took place there. The book is valuable as the process of 
sovietisation is presented in light of soviet sources. 
2
 Among eight-point assumptions of the Atlantic Charter whose signatory was  inter alia the Soviet Union, was  
the right of all nations to elect and have its own government and an independent state as well as to abandon all 
aspirations to obtain territorial and all other gains. However, the culmination of the accomplished fact policy was 
the transformation of the Polish Committee for National Liberation in the Temporary Government of the Republic 
of Poland, even though the British and American parties expressed their object ions. 
3
 The so-called Yalta system consisting in connivance to formation of zones of influence in the world.  
4
 As cited in: KERSTEN (1989) 18. It is worth noting the fact that the President of the United States, having great 
affection and admiration for Stalin, was a proponent of broad collaboration with him. Consequently, President's 
fascination with the dictator led to too much submissiveness, which resulted in Stalin's hegemony in the territories 
occupied by the USSR. You can hear voices among historians that Roosevelt's attitude was the effect of the work 
of numerous Soviet agents present in his environment. 
5
 In the Soviet communist system there was no place for individuals thinking independently. 
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It became clearer and with time even obvious, that western democracies turned out too weak 
and naive in confrontation with Soviet totalitarian ism whose essence they did not fully comprehend. 
Maxim Maximovich Litvinov, a participant in the revolutionary movement in Russia, wrote in 1938 in  
his diary he kept in complete secrecy: „Foreigners understand nothing of our matters (...) except for the 
Poles who are overly comprehensive of what is happening at us (...). If they had a population of 60 
million as the Germans, we would be fin ished. Fortunately, there are only 20 million of Poles”. 6 And 
perhaps due to the lack of understanding of the fact that Bolshevism does not allow any compromise,  
a new stage opened in the lives of the European national communit ies divided by the tide of Soviet 
influence, where a newly-establish block of socialist states was marginalised for many years, moved to 
the periphery of the economic, cultural and consequently social development.  Poland met such fate,  
a country which Stalin heavily disliked due to the course of the Russo -Polish war and the role he 
played in it.7   
The intricate plan started to materialize as early as September 1939. The  conquest and 
occupation of Polish eastern territory was just the beginning of brutal subjugation of the hated nation. 
On the other hand, the time of over 50-year trauma, which the Polish society was to go through on its 
way to self-determination, started; it was also the time of relentless fight for this freedom.  
 Formation of the Polish Committee for National Liberation (PKW N) in Moscow, which 
perturbed western partners of the Tehran Conference, has affected the destiny of the country.  
The PKWN, which actually was the second Polish government, established its position as the main  
centre of power in the country in a quick and decisive manner, taking over executive initiat ive in  
the territory successively conquered by the Red Army. The Committee wielded real authority over this 
land with the Soviet army and NKVD paving the way. Stalin, Beria and Molotov realized it perfectly  
well that without appropriate military support from them, the PKWN would not be able to hold power. 
„You have such power now that if you say two times two is sixteen, your opponent will agree. When I 
look at your work, I think that if the Russian Army was gone, in a week, you would also be gone. (...) 
they would shoot you as partridges” Stalin said about the illusory Polish government an d their 
supporters.8  
 Local centres of power, without which the operations of the PKWN would be simply id le, 
started to spring up. At the same time, the PKW N was for these centres a guarantee of their existence 
in the territory of the country occupied by the Red Army, including those where it was particularly  
difficult to establish the people's state - the areas of eastern Poland.  Thus, basing on the Soviet model, 
the PKWN organised the security service which became the main tool of wielding authority by  
the Lublin Committee. So the security offices and militia  were formed as part of the repression system, 
compliant and totally subordinated to its Soviet counterpart i.e. the NKVD, which under  
the „Agreement between the Polish Committee for National Liberation and the Government of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on relations between the Soviet commander in chief and Polish 
administration after the Soviet army have entered the territory of Poland”, took over complete ruling 
over the Polish society. At the same time, at an extremely quick pace, further decrees, aimed at and 
hurting with all the force the independency structures and organisations which were in the opposition 
to communists and their vision of the post-war Poland, came into force. „Dekret Polskiego Komitetu 
Wyzwolenia Narodowego z dnia 24 sierpnia 1944 roku o rozwiązaniu tajnych organizacyj 
wojskowych na terenach wyzwolonych” (Decree of the Polish Committee for National Liberation of 
24 August 1944 on dissolution of secret military organisations in the liberated territory),9 or decrees of 
23 September 1944: „Kodeks Karny Wojska Polskiego” (Penal Code of the Polish Army), 10 „Przep isy 
                                                                 
6
 As cited in: KERSTEN (1989) 101. 
7
 Stalin ignored the order of Kamenev, the commander-in-chief of the Red Army, relating to moving troops from 
the South-West Front under the command of Tukhachevsky who was planning to conquer Warsaw. Thus, Stalin's  
attitude contributed to the defeat of the Red Army soldiers in the Battle of Warsaw in the Russo-Polish war.  
8
 It is a statement Stalin addressed to the PKWN delegates for Moscow talks in October 1944 as reported by B. 
Bierut and M. Żymierski. As cited in: KOPF, STARBA-BAŁUK (1999) 581. 
9
 See: Journal of Laws of 1944 No. 3 item 12. 
10
 See: Journal of Laws of 1944 No. 6 item 27. 
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wprowadzające Kodeks Karny Wojska Polskiego” (Regulations introducing the Penal Code of  
the Polish Army)11 and „Prawo o ustroju Sądów Wojskowych i Prokuratury Wojskowej” (Law of 
Courts-martial and Military Prosecutor Office)12 were just perfect examples of such actions.  
 Using the latter, a legal and disciplinary foundation was formed for the functioning of  
the Polish Army (WP), whose dynamic organisation was just commenced, in line with the set targets. 
The newly formed army, as Andrzej Friszke wrote, was intended as an instrument of Soviet policy  
aimed at introducing a communist regime in Po land, and its „peop le's character” was to emphasise  
the link with this new, socialist regime.13 And consequently, apart from security officers and militia, 
soldiers of the revived Polish Army were given the task of supporting the new people's authority in its 
actions aimed at vassalization of the state under the dictation of the USSR, which could be seen very 
clearly in 1946 (the referendum) and in 1947 (the elections). Still, implicating the army in  
the implementation of these two great political forgeries was not the darkest page in its history. Its 
participation in fighting the independence underground, which was intensified and lasted till January 
elections, was classified as even a worse act. In this way the WP became an important tool in hands of 
new authoritarian administration serving a foreign state, which was aiming decisively at subjugation of 
the Polish people. The army, due to its power, constituted a crucial link in the newly -formed polit ical 
system. Basing just on its human resources, one could „dip lomatically” clear the country of  
„the reactionary underground”. That is why Stalin gave it so much attention. 
The beginnings of the organisation of the revived WP date back to the first days o f July 1944. 
Dreaming of commanding over-a-million army,14 on 6th July 1944 Żymierski presented to Stalin the 
plan to extend it.  The dictator d id not give his consent to form such numerous Polish army, because he 
was simply afraid of its power at the time when Po land would be assimilated into the Soviet zone of 
influence (ignoring the fact that, as time told, the planes were unmanageable). The Po lish Army Front 
which was being organised was to include only 400,000 soldiers and comprise 3 field  armies  
(15 infantry divisions), 4 armoured corps, 15 art illery brigades, 2 heavy artillery divisions, 2 air corps, 
3 sapper brigades, 3 barrier brigades and units of command, support and  backing. Further reductions 
of the planned organisational structures of the WP took place after the outbreak of the Warsaw 
Uprising. Stalin's distrust towards the Poles resulted in shrinking the million army to just a 330-
thousand army based, as previously, on the Polish Army Front, having:  3 field armies (12 infantry 
divisions) and an armoured corps, an air corps and a heavy artillery division, as well as many other 
military units of different types.15  
A bit earlier, dated as of 21 July 1944, the act of the State National Council (KRN) on taking 
control of the Polish Army (WP) organised in the territory of the USSR and combining it with the 
People's Army (AL) organised in the country, thus forming a uniform Polish Army, was published. In 
its text the document also referred to the issue of forming the „General Command of the Po lish 
Army”16 (NDWP), comprising ex officio the chief of the Head Quarters of WP (SGW P). At first, it was 
Spychalski, quickly rep laced with Soviet generals: Władysław Korczyc, who was then replaced by 
                                                                 
11
 See: Journal of Laws of 1944 No. 6 item 28. 
12
 See: Journal of Laws of 1944 No. 6 item 29. 
13
 FRISZKE (2003) 103.  
14
 Żymierski's ploy referring to the size of the future army is mentioned in E. Kospath-Pawłowski's work titled 
„Wojsko Polskie na Wschodzie 1943–1945”, section III (Wojsko Polskie Polski Lubelskiej (Wojsko Polski 
Lubelskiej). See: KOSPATH-PAWŁOWSKI (1993) 136. 
15
 The above mentioned ventures were planned for three stages: until 15 September, 1 November and 1 December 
1944, while as early as on 15 November the plan to establish 3rd Army of the WP was abandoned. See: 
KOSPATH-PAWŁOWSKI (1993) 136-137; JURGIELEWICZ (1973) 142. In the planned structure of the WP  
the armies did not have the corpus level. Abandoning the formation of the operating detachment such as 3rd Army 
of the WP was mentioned in the contents of the order of Żymierski of mid November 1944. See: the Central 
Military Archive (henceforth: CAW), Rozkaz Nr Org./59 z dnia 15 listopada 1944 r. NDWP, sygn. III-1-303, 
Rozkazy organizacyjne NDWP, k. 139-140 (Order No. Org./59 of 15 November 1944 of the General Command of 
the Polish Army (NDWP) , ref. III-1-303, Organisational orders of the NDWP, c. 139-140). 
16
 See: Journal of Laws of 1944 No. 1 item 2. 
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Bolesław Zarako-Zarakowski.17 This way Stalin ensured himself the control over Polish main military 
authorities already in their early stage of organisation, disclosing at the same time his far-reaching 
distrust concerning the staff holding key positions in the command structures of the organised WP.18 
Stalin  also found another way to influence and acquire complete control over the military  
units formed under the Polish banner. He directed thousands of officers of the Red Army, who took up 
commanding positions, to serve in these units. As Bohdan Urbankowski wrote: „As far back as at  
the beginning of 1945, out of 40,000 officers there were 18,996 Soviet officers, mostly high in rank, 
including 36 generals”.19 In newly fo rmed units the proportions were even more frightening. The 4th 
Div ision of Anti Aircraft Artillery may be a perfect example here. The unit, which was intended to 
serve as the reserve of the NDWP, was formed in the Siedlce area based on Order No. 8 of 20 August 
1944 issued in Lublin by the NDWP together with Appendix No. 11 referring to the organisational 
structures and headcount of the division.20 In this force, in September 1944, only 4 officers serving in 
this unit were Polish; the others came from the Red Army ad did not speak any Polish. What is more, 
out of 538 full-time non-commissioned positions only 15 were filled and out of 1,399 corresponding 
private soldier positions only 88 were taken.21 Several weeks later, the situation did not change 
considerably. In  mid October 1944 the headcount of the division increased from 2,177 to 2,290 
soldiers. Ninety percent of the 109 officers serving in the division at that time were the Red Army 
soldiers (the headcount provided for 272 commissioned positions).22  
                                                                 
17
 Spychalski was dismissed from the position of the head of the SGWP on 4.09.1944, whereas at the end of 1944 
the position was retaken by Korczyc.  
18
 Lieutenant general Michał Rola-Żymierski, commander of the People's Army became the Commander-in-Chief. 
He also held the position of the head of National Defence Department of the PKWN; his deputies were major 
general Zygmunt Berling – commander of the Polish Army in the USSR and brigadier general Aleksander 
Zawadzki – the deputy commander for Politics and Education of the Polish Army in the USSR, the chairman of 
the Central Polish Communist Office, and the members of the command were colonel Marian Spychalski – as  
a head of the General Staff of the Polish Army and Jan Czechowski –  the representative of the KRN. See: 
GRZELAK, STAŃCZYK, ZWOLIŃSKI (2003) 51. It is worth mentioning that Zawadzki was already a non -
commissioned officer in September 1943. Frontczak presents some information on the tasks of the NDWP in his 
paper titled „Siły Zbrojne Polski Ludowej. Przejście na stopę pokojową 1945–1947”. See: FRONTCZAK (1974) 
15-21. 
19
 URBANKOWSKI (2010) 480. Historians are also of the opinion that such a number of the Red Army officers 
set their foot in the ranks of the WP from 1943 to 1945.  
20
 CAW, Rozkaz Nr 8 z dnia 20 sierpnia 1944 r. NDWP, sygn. III-1-303, Rozkazy organizacyjne NDWP, k. 6-7; 
Ibid., Załącznik Nr 11 do Rozkazu Nr 8 z dnia 20 sierpnia 1944 r. NDWP, sygn. III-1-303, Rozkazy organizacyjne 
NDWP, k. 26 (CAW, Order No. 8 of 20 August 1944 of the General Command of the Polish Army (NDWP) , ref. 
III-1-303, Organisational orders of the NDWP, c. 6-7; Ibid., Appendix No. 11 to Order No. 8 of 20 August 1944of 
the NDWP, ref. III-1-303, Organisational Orders of the NDWP, c. 26). The document specified the date of 1 
November 1944 as the deadline for the formation of this unit. The division comprised inter alia 4 anti-aircraft 
artillery regiments: 77th, 79th, 81st and 83rd located as follows: 77th Regt. – in Wólka Wołyniecka (as of 
10.09.1944, in the source document the regiment is listed as number 67th); 79th Regt. – in Wyłazy (as of 
14.09.1944); 81st Regt. – in Wołyńce (as of 13.09.1944); 83rd. Regt. – in Wólka Wołyniecka (as of 10.09.1944). 
Cited as in: Ibid. Schematy rozlokowania jednostek dywizji,  sygn. III-218-3, k. 1, 2, 4 (Plans of deployment of 
division units, ref. III-218-3, c.1, 2, 4).  
21
 Ibid., Sprawozdanie [instruktora wydziału polityczno-wychowawczego 4. DAPlot,  P.W.] z pracy za okres od 13 
września do 19 września 1944 r., sygn. III-2-33, Sprawozdania dekadowe z pracy polityczno-wychowawczej i 
meldunki o dezercji w 4 DAPlot., k. 1 (Report [prepared by the instructor of the political and educational 
department of the 4th Anti-aircraft Artillery Division, P.W.] on work for the period from 13 September to 19 
September 1944, ref. III-2-33, Decade reports on political and educational work and despatches on desertion in 
the 4th Anti-aircraft Artillery Division, c.1). Division headcount changed; this given in the text refers to the time 
frame specified in the source document. 
22
 Ibid., Sprawozdanie [instruktora wydziału polityczno-wychowawczego 4. DAPlot,  P.W.] z pracy za okres do 13 
października 1944 r., sygn. III-2-33, Sprawozdania dekadowe z pracy polityczno-wychowawczej i meldunki o 
dezercji w 4 DAPlot., k. 5 (Report [prepared by the instructor of the political and educational department of the 
4th Anti-aircraft Artillery Division, P.W.] on work for the period till 13 October 1944, ref. III-2-33, Decade 
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Similar proportions were seen in other military units formed at that time, with the difference 
in the fact that infantry div isions, which were based to a lesser extent on commissioned officers who as 
a rule should have a specified (appropriate) military specialization (as for artillerymen and radio  
operators), the percentage was lower. The 4th Anti-aircraft Artillery Division was not an isolated case, 
and such cases could be listed again and again, at the same t ime one could ask a rhetorical question: 
Was there the Polish Army at that time?  
„Dekret Polskiego Komitetu Wyzwolenia Narodowego z dnia 15 sierpnia 1944 r.  
o częściowej mobilizacji i rejestracji ludności do służby wojskowej” (Decree of the Polish Committee 
for Nat ional Liberat ion of 15 August 1944 on partial mobilisation and registration of populace for the 
military service),23 did not bring intended results, which is reflected among other things in the process 
of organisation of the 4th Anti-aircraft Artillery Division. The process of supplementing the headcount 
of the units under formation was extremely painful; with several reasons behind that.24 Resentment of 
many Polish citizens towards the WP, which was identified to a greater and greater extent with the new 
communist regime, was just one of them.25 Another one was limited mobilisation capacity of the areas 
„liberated” from the German army. It is also a fact that the decree itself was a hidden blow in the 
independence organisations as it forced the members of these organisations to disclose and to join  
the WP, which was an attempt to weaken the structures of these organisations. Paradoxically, they 
were supported by citizens trying to avoid being drafted, who boycotted the mobilisation action in this 
manner.26 Despite this fact, alongside many opportunists and conformists, also many patriots joined  
the ranks of the army to fight the German occupier. Many members of the conspiratorial military  
forces of the Polish Underground State and conspiratorial military organisations enrolled into  
the developing army. Despite intense political indoctrination, this section of the military community 
decreased the level of military discipline in its political plane, whereas general lax military attitude 
encouraged desertion, appropriation and intemperance. Of course, Stalin realised that the WP was 
infested with ideological opponents, which seems to be an intended action in  a way. It was easy to 
„fish out” ideological enemies, no matter whether former or present ones, in the army which was 
hermet ic and strict in terms of disciplinary regulations.  Let us take the 8th Infantry Div ision of  
the revived WP as an example. Works on reorganisation of this tactical detachment commenced as 
early as the first days of August 1944. At first, it was supposed to be the so -called „partisan division”, 
which meant that Żymierski was planning to base its organisation on partisan troops, in th is case  
the troops operating the Lublin area. It opened a possibility to organise the unit quickly and to 
incorporate and control within the ranks of the WP the organisations which were at least disinclined to 
the army formed under the USSR banner.  That is why ideological differences which were among them 
were of some importance. And at the beginning of August 1944, it was not any cynicism on the part of 
the commander-in-chief with reference to at least one of the troops of the Home Army (AK).  The base 
of the division was to be formed by the partisan build-up „Jeszcze Po lska nie zg inęła” commanded by 
lieutenant colonel Robert Satanowski. 27 Composed of two brigades with the total force of about 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
reports on political and educational work and despatches on desertion in the 4th Anti-aircraft Artillery Division, c. 
5). 
23
 Journal of Laws of 1944 No. 2 item 5.  
24
 Thus, the PKWN issued another decree, this time on further partial mobilisation to the military service dated as  
of 30 October 1944. See: Dekret Polskiego Komitetu Wyzwolenia Narodowego z dnia 30 października 1944 r. o 
dalszej częściowej mobilizacji do służby wojskowej( Decree of the Polish Committee for National Liberation of 30 
October 1944 on further partial mobilisation to military service, Journal of Laws 1944 No. 10, item 51). 
25
 Jerzy R. Krzyżanowski, nom de guerre „Szpic”, a soldier of the Special Flying Squad of the AK, who joined the 
8th Infantry Division in Sieldce and Siedlce area, reports the encounter between the AK soldiers, who wanted to 
join the newly formed WP, and the local people: „(...)  they turned their back with disdain and disinclination when 
they heard that they would volunteer for a deployment with the new army.” As cited in: KRZYŻANOWSKI 
(1995) 216. For more information of the 8th Infantry Division see further sections of this paper.  
26
 Independence groups, opposed to the PKWN, called for boycotting of the mobilisation action.  
27
 Tadeusz Pióro, while mentioning the Satanowski and his military career, writes that Satanowski at the age of 27 
had already the rank of colonel (acquired by means of verification), which he assigned himself. See: PIÓRO 
(1994) 26.  
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1,15028 people the build-up had been operating in the Lublin area since spring 1944 and it was not an 
accident that it was here. Linked with the AL and, as a Soviet partisan unit, perfectly armed, it  
constituted good foundations for the construction of a new Polish infantry division, mostly owing to 
political correctness of the soldiers who served there. Satanowski was well informed about the plans to 
create the WP in the area to the east of the Curzone line. He passed this knowledge to Aleksander 
Sarkisov „Szaruga”, the commander of the Special Flying Squad of the AK (SOL AK), the second 
partisan unit whose staff joined the ranks of the 8th Infantry Division (DP). „Szaruga”'s forces were 
responsible for taking drops of arms and the silent-dark-ones in the assigned operating area from 
October 1943 to May 1944.  The proximity of the area where Satanowski and Sarkisov operated 
resulted in their collaboration in joint military actions against the German occupying troops. This, in 
turn, led to the two commanders meeting again at the beginning of July 1944 and taking up furthe r 
collaboration, now as soldiers of the Po lish Army. 
A significant encounter between Żymierski and Satanowski took place already on 4 August 
1944. On this date the commander-in-chief entrusted him with the duties relating to format ion of  
the division and he accepted. Bearing in mind set deadlines, Satanowski started his work on the 
organisation of the unit trying in the first place to provide commanding personnel, which in fact 
formed the unit foundations. Thus, he offered cooperation on formation of the d ivision to Sarkisov, 
taking into consideration „Szaruga”'s and his soldiers' commanding skills. Then, it was a fact that  
the soldiers of SOL AK took up command positions in the structures of regiments included in the 8th 
Infantry Division, unfortunately, not for long. On 28th August 1944, they were dismissed from their 
positions, after a group of Soviet officers directed to serve in the divisions, led by the commander 
colonel Vasyl Gulida, was unloaded at the Siedlce train station. Over several weeks, they  were 
arrested, tried and sentenced to long imprisonment or death penalty; out of 9 of the highest possible 
adjudicated penalties, 8 were carried out. Świerczewski refused to grant power of pardon, writing just 
shortly „Rejected” on the applications. The soldiers were executed by firing squad.29  
Those who fought for independent Poland, which could not be free, during the German  
occupation met such incomprehensible fate. As Stalin said: „Where there is a Soviet soldier, there is 
the Soviet Union” and unfortunately that was the case, with all its consequences which Polish society 
tried to oppose to, with no comprehensible result.30 
General situation in the country was reflected direct ly in the climate in the army. The presence 
of thousands of Soviet soldiers only worsened the situation. Difficult conditions accompanying its 
formation and a deplorable procurement logistics process (which was understandable, taking into 
consideration the condition of the Polish economy, if at all we may talk about it at that time) were also 
of some importance.  The army was literally short of everything. „At first, it was difficult to recognise 
the army in this bunch, only after several weeks people stopped „wearing civil duds” (...)” as  
the Chronicle of 36th Łużyce Infantry Regiment (Kronika 38. Łużyckiego Pułku Piechoty) said.31  
Whereas in order No. 0395-KG of the commander of the 1st Army of the WP of September 1945 on 
procurement logistics we can read that soldiers did not receive a full dietary norm or vegetables but 
                                                                 
28
 PIÓRO (1994) 26: gives the count of two thousand people. 
29
 I gave information on the beginnings of formation of the 8th DP based on a book by J. R. Krzyżanowski  U 
„Szarugi”. Partyzancka opowieść published in Lublin in 1995. See: KRZYŻANOWSKI (1995). The information 
included there was completely omitted in earlier works referring strictly to the 8th Infantry Division in the time of 
its organisation, for example a monograph by S. RZEPSKI „8 dywizja piechoty” (Warszawa 1970); „Regularne 
jednostki ludowego Wojska Polskiego. Formowanie, działania bojowe, organizacja, uzbrojenie, metryki jednostek 
piechoty” by S. KOMORNICKI (Warszawa 1977); „Jednostki wojska Polski Lubelskiej formowane na Ziemi 
Siedleckiej w 1944 roku” by E. PAWŁOWSKI („Szkice Podlaskie”, 4, 1994); „8 Dywizja Piechoty w dziejach 
oręża polskiego” written by E. KOSPATH-PAWŁOWSKI, P. MATUSAK, D. RADZIWIŁŁOWICZ (Pruszków 
1995), as well as two works by J. STRYCHALSKI: „Ludowe Wojsko Polskie w województwie siedleckim 1944–
1945” (Siedlce 1983) and „Formowanie jednostek 2 Armii Wojska Polskiego w rejonie Siedlec” (Siedlce 1984).  
30
 It is Stalin's well known saying, and looking at the present day Crimea is seems to be up -to-date. 
31
 CAW, Kronika [36. Łużyckiego Pułku Piechoty,  P.W.] 08.1944-17.05.1949,  sygn. III-104-42, k. 3 (CAW, 
Chronicle [of the 36 th Łużyce Infantry Regt. P.W.] 08.1944-17.05.1949, ref.  III-104-42, c. 3). The 36th infantry 
regt. was one of three infantry regiments included in the 8th Infantry Division. 
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they ate chewy, underbaked bread; that they had meals on the floor, with no tables and benches and 
that the kitchen, canteen and bakery staff was often dirty and lousy, working without going through 
necessary medical examinations. „In the scope of uniform, sanitary  and accommodation supplies,  
the situation is slightly better - still, it is far from the required standard” as the document read.32 In  
the initial period many soldiers who came from the USSR paraded in Soviet uniforms, what made 
soldiers distrust the structures of the WP they belonged to. There were efforts made to eliminate it as 
soon as possible so that there were no doubts that the newly formed army is Polish. Naturally, due to 
the large number of the Red Army officers serving in the WP, internal communication became more of 
a problem. The majority of orders, dispatches and reports prepared in the military units was written in 
Russian. It was also often required from subordinates that they use Russian in work relat ions. It caused 
justified defiance in soldiers of all ranks; all the more reason was that a large proportion of soldiers 
were illiterate. There were effo rts made to suppress this rebellion, and at the same time courses of  
the Polish language were organised for Soviet soldiers.33 
While all officers who did not have appropriate command of Polish, and were assigned from 
the Red Army, were ordered to „wear only the uniform of the Red Army by the time they pass their 
Polish exam”.34 The lack of clear division of competence resulted in command chaos, disorganising  
the functioning of military units and institutions. A diverging interpretation of orders and commanders' 
flexib ility in their implementation or even their complete abandonment were a common situation.35 
Additionally, many of those were directed to the army were the chronically ill, the disabled or invalids 
from auxiliary units, who were unable to serve.36 It also happened that headcount was supplemented 
without informing the SGWP (direct ly from Regional Draft Offices), what was pointed out by 
Żymierski in his order No. 37 of 27 September 1944. 37 
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 Ibid., Rozkaz Nr 0395-KG z dnia 5 września 1945 r., sygn. III-102-1, 8 Dywizja Zmechanizowana 32 Pułk 
Zmechanizowany – Rozkazy i Zarządzenia Naczelnego Dowództwa Wojska Polskiego rok 1945 1.01-31.12, k. 41. 
(Order No. 0395-KG of 5 September 1945, ref. III-102-1, 8th Mechanised Division 32nd Mechanised Regiment - 
Orders and regulations of the General Command of the Polish Army year 1945 1.01-31.12, c. 41).  
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 See: Ibid., Rozkaz Nr 0147 z dnia 27 czerwca 1945 r. Dowódcy 4. DAPlot, sygn. III-218-37, Rozkazy i 
zarządzenia dowództwa dywizji w sprawach dyscyplinarnych, personalnych, szkolenia bojowego, uzbrojenia i 
administracyjno-gospodarczych [dalej: Rozkazy i zarządzenia dowództwa dywizji] , k. 205 (Order No. 0147 of 27 
June 1945 of the Commander of 4th Anti-aircraft Artillery Division, ref. III-218-37, Orders and regulations of the 
division command on disciplinary and personnel issues , battlefield training, armament as well as administrative 
and economic issues [henceforth: Orders and regulations of the division command] , c. 205); Ibid., Rozkaz Nr 66 
[brak daty wydania, P.W.] Dowódcy 4. DAPlot w sprawie nauki języka polskiego w Sztabie i Kwatermistrzostwie 
Dywizji, sygn. III-218-37, Rozkazy i zarządzenia dowództwa dywizji, k. 59 (Order No. 66 [no date of issue P.W.] 
of the Commander of 4th Anti-aircraft Artillery Division on teaching of the Polish language in the Headquarters 
and Logistics of the Division, ref. III-218-37, Orders and regulations of the division command, c. 59) Ibid., Rozkaz 
Nr 67 [brak daty wydania, P.W.] Dowódcy 4. DAPlot w sprawie lekcji języka polskiego, sygn. III-218-37, Rozkazy 
i zarządzenia dowództwa dywizji, k. 60. (Order No. 67 [no date of issue P.W.] of the Commander of 4th Anti-
aircraft Artillery Division on Polish lessons, ref. III-218-37, Orders and regulations of the division command c. 
60). 
34
 Ibid., Rozkaz Nr 0320-KG z dnia 1 sierpnia 1945 r., sygn. III-102-1, 8 Dywizja Zmechanizowana 32 Pułk 
Zmechanizowany – Rozkazy i Zarządzenia Naczelnego Dowództwa Wojska Polskiego rok 1945 1.01-31.12, k. 51. 
(Order No. 0320-KG of 1 August 1945, ref. III-102-1, 8th Mechanised Division 32nd Mechanised Regiment - 
Orders and regulations of the General Command of the Polish Army year 1945 1.01-31.12, c. 51).  
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 Such conclusions can be made based on the analysis of the orders and regulations of NDWP issued in 1945. 
See: Ibid., 8 Dywizja Zmechanizowana 32 Pułk Zmechanizowany – Rozkazy i Zarządzenia Naczelnego 
Dowództwa Wojska Polskiego rok 1945 1.01-31.12, sygn. III-102-1 (8th Mechanised Division 32nd Mechanised 
Regiment - Orders and regulations of the General Command of the Polish Army year 1945 1.01-31.12, ref. III-
102-1)  
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 See: Ibid., Rozkaz Nr ORG/75 z dnia 30 listopada 1944 r. NDWP, sygn. III-1-305, Rozkazy organizacyjne 
NDWP, k. 16 (Order No. ORG/75 of 30 November 1944 of the General Command of the Polish Army, ref.III-1-
305, Organisational orders of the General Command of the Polish Army, c. 16).  
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 See: Ibid., Rozkaz Nr 37 z dnia 27 września 1944 r. NDWP, sygn. III-1-303, Rozkazy organizacyjne NDWP, k. 
62 (Order No. 37 of 27 September 1944 of the General Command of the Polish Army, ref.III-1-303, 
Organisational orders of the General Command of the Polish Army, c. 62).  
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Discip line in military units and institutions was at a very low level, which was a symptom of 
rebellion of some military staff against the situation in the army. Some of them found it difficult to 
accept the deepening politicizat ion of the army (its dependence on the new communist authorities).  
A perfect example may be the desertion of several hundreds of soldiers of the 31 Regt. of the 7th 
Infantry Div ision which took place on the night of 12 October 1944. 38 Certain ly, it was the largest 
group desertion which happened in the Polish Army. Smaller group desertions or individual ones were 
a common occurrence e.g. in mid November 1944 in 1st Independent Mortar Brigade six such cases 
were reported,39 whereas in 4th Anti-aircraft Artillery Division fourteen soldiers deserted from  
1 January to 15 April 1945, and next four in  July. 40 A complete lack of command authorities and 
organisational derangement in many areas of the army functioning was an additional element affecting 
the low level of discip line. „There is no military discipline, as people are ununiformed, they stand at 
checkpoints barefoot, wearing hardly anything.  (...) Poor morale, they do not feel they are the army” 
wrote a political and educational officer of the 4th Anti-aircraft Art illery Division in one of the work 
reports in September 1944.41  
Officers, who were to set an example for troopers, frequently contributed to lowering of the 
morale of the army and to corruption of military discipline, which was helped by political and 
education officers who were to shape this order. „Among political and educational officers, one may  
see a clear loosening of discipline and lack of understanding of the work they do and positions they 
held.  Often political and education officers themselves cannot live up to expectations and they even 
abuse power and disgrace the uniform of Po lish officers, instead  of setting an example to other 
officers”.42 This is how the commander of 4th Anti-aircraft Artillery Div ision wrote about out-of-work 
activities of a political and education officer of 2nd battery of 81st regiment of anti -aircraft artillery.43  
In another paragraph of the same order (assessing the attitude of another political and 
education officer, this time from 1st battery 81st regiment of anti-aircraft artillery) he added: „There 
are cases that instead of working on educating soldiers in patriotic spirit , so that they hate the Germans 
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 Ibid., Rozkaz Nr 51 z dnia 16 października 1944 r. NDWP, sygn. III-1-303, Rozkazy organizacyjne NDWP, k. 
104. (Order No. 51 of 16 October 1944 of the General Command of the Polish Army, ref.III-1-303, 
Organisational orders of the General Command of the Polish Army, c. 104).  
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 Ibid., Pismo dowódcy 1. SBM w sprawie przeprowadzenia przysięgi wojskowej w pododdziałach brygady 
kierowane do dowódcy artylerii WP z dnia 13 listopada 1944 r., sygn. III-185-1, Meldunki o stanie bojowym oraz 
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 Ibid., Rozkaz Nr 082 z dnia 19 kwietnia 1945 r. Dowódcy 4. DAPlot w sprawie środków w walce z 
dezerterstwem w jednostkach 4-ej Dywizji Artylerii Przeciwlotniczej RND W.P., sygn. III-218-37, Rozkazy i 
zarządzenia dowództwa dywizji,  k. 93 (Order No. 082 of 19 April 1945 of the Commander of the 4th Anti-aircraft 
Artillery Division on measures to combat desertion in units of the 4th Anti-aircraft Artillery Division of the Polish 
Army, ref. III-218-37, Orders and regulations of the division command, c. 93); Ibid., Rozkaz Nr 0183 z dnia 26 
lipca 1945 r. Dowódcy 4. DAPlot w sprawie dezercji w oddziałach, sygn. III-218-37, Rozkazy i zarządzenia 
dowództwa dywizji, k. 241 (Order No. 0183 of 26 July 1945 of the Commander of the 4th Anti-aircraft Artillery 
Division on desertion in the units, ref. III-218-37, Orders and regulations of the division command, c. 241).  
41
 Ibid., Sprawozdanie [instruktora wydziału polityczno-wychowawczego 4. DAPlot,  P.W.] z pracy za okres od 13 
września do 19 września 1944 r., sygn. III-2-33, Sprawozdania dekadowe z pracy polityczno-wychowawczej i 
meldunki o dezercji w 4 DAPlot., k. 1 (Report [prepared by the instructor of the political and educational 
department of the 4th Anti-aircraft Artillery Division, P.W.] on work for the period from 13 September 1944 to 19 
September 1944, ref. III-2-33, Decade reports on political and educational work and despatches on desertion in 
the 4th Anti-aircraft Artillery Division, c. 1).  
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 Ibid., Rozkaz Nr 054 [brak daty wydania, P.W.] Dowódcy 4. DAPlot w sprawie oficerów pol-wych., sygn. III-
218-37, Rozkazy i zarządzenia dowództwa dywizji,  k. 28 (Order No. 054 [no date of issue, P.W.] of the 
Commander of the 4th  Anti-aircraft Artillery Division on political and educational officers, ref. III-218-37, Orders 
and regulations of the Division Command, c. 28). 
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 This officer, who abused alcohol: „(...) being under influence, he came to the flat of a Polish watchmaker, he 
gave him hell, shot at the doors and windows and in the end he demanded to be given two watches”. Ibid. 
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and are friendly towards the USSR, polit ical and education officers induce the opposite effect due to 
their behaviour, work system and attitude towards soldiers. (...) Instead of educating soldiers in hatred 
towards the Germans, he himself [the political and education officer of 1st battery of 81st regiment of 
anti-aircraft artillery, P.W.] lived openly with a german woman [sic!] and while talking to her he 
besmeared the Red Army saying that: „We, poles [sic!] don't want to act like the russians [sic!] who 
loot and kill people”.44 Such attitude of „the uniformed educators” quickly spread onto the rest of  
the military society.  
Apart from desertion, it was alcohol which constituted a real threat to formation of military  
discipline. In source documents referring to the functioning of the army at that time we may find 
frequent mentioning of the servicemen abusing it.  The problem annoyed the WP and was present at all 
command level (in all personnel groups).  It was alcohol that was the reason for the transfer at first and 
next the dismissal of the head of staff of 77th regiment of anti-aircraft art illery and other officers of 
this regiment.45  
An interesting situation, where the servicemen participated, also took place in Lublin, wh ere 
after constantly repeated shootings, the commander decided to intervene. „Commanders of military  
divisions, plants and institutions shall ensure under personal penalties that the constantly repeating 
shootings in Lublin stop. Those guilty should be held responsible” he wrote in a September order in 
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 While working on soldier education, this officer: „(...) used the system of threats, terrorized subordinates with 
gun at every occasion, called soldiers „bandits and thieves””. Ibid. 
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 Ibid., Sprawozdanie dekadowe [oficera polityczno-wychowawczego 4. DAPlot, P.W.] za okres do dnia 10 
grudnia 1944 r., sygn. III-2-33, Sprawozdania dekadowe z pracy polityczno-wychowawczej i meldunki o dezercji 
w 4 DAPlot., k. 46 (Decade report [prepared by the instructor of the political and educational department of the 
4th Anti-aircraft Artillery Division, P.W] for the period till 10 December 1944, ref. III-2-33, Decade reports on 
political and educational work and despatches on desertion in the 4th Anti-aircraft Artillery Division, c. 46).  
Officers of the 4th Anti-aircraft Artillery Division (81st regiment of anti-aircraft artillery) participated in a very 
interesting situation which happened during an evening party for officers organised on 3 May 1945, when there 
was a fight between officers, who as expected were under influence of alcohol. As the division commander put it, 
the reason for the fight were „women from the street” invited to this party. The consequence (also of other events 
that happened there) was that the commander banned such nights for officers of the regiment. The Red Army 
officers serving in the division (the regiment) played the most important part in these events. See: Ibid, Rozkaz Nr 
009 z dnia 6 maja 1945 r. Dowódcy 4. DAPlot w sprawie: o oficerskim wieczorze w 81 p.art.p-lotn. w dn. 
3.5.1945 r., sygn. III-218-37, Rozkazy i zarządzenia dowództwa dywizji, k. 129 (Order No. 009 of 6 May 1945 of 
the Commander of the 4th Anti-aircraft Artillery Division on officers party in the 81st regiment of anti-aircraft 
artillery on 03.05.1945, ref. III-218-37, Orders and regulations of the division command, c. 129). 
A few days later, on 20.05.1945, a similar night was organised for officers of 77th regiment of the anti-aircraft 
artillery of the 4th Anti-aircraft Artillery Division. It was even „more interesting”, which was reported by the 
division commander and it is worth mentioning: „When I arrived at this evening party for officers at 11 p.m. I 
noticed that 50% of those at the tables were drunk, some officers were wearing civil c lothes, there were women, 
also intoxicated, at the side of each officer, who the officers sitting at the tables were embracing and kissing. The 
women seemed to be prostitutes rather than guests. The room was quite sombre and the whole thing looked like a 
night at a second-rate cabaret rather than a cultured evening party for officers. The commander of the regiment 
lieutenant colonel Trofimov and his deputy for politics and education still do not understand that the evening party 
for officers is an opportunity to spend time in a cultured way and to entertain and it is not the night of drinking and 
debauchery. Returning from this evening party for officers I met colonel Atrasimov who took off his cap and 
uniform and put them on a woman he was bracing. When I r emarked that he breached the regulations on uniforms 
he replied that „she was cold so I gave her the uniform””. Ibid., Rozkaz Nr 109 z dnia 24 maja 1945 r. Dowódcy 4. 
DAPlot w sprawie dyscypliny stanu osobowego w 77 p.a.p.l., sygn. III-218-37, Rozkazy i zarządzenia dowództwa 
dywizji, k. 153 (Order No. 109 of 24 May 1945 of the Commander of the 4t Anti-aircraft Artillery Division on 
discipline of staff in the 77th regt. of the anti-aircraft artillery, ref. III-218-37, Orders and regulations of division 
command, c.153). 
Another interesting event related to alcohol abuse among officers took place also on 20.05.1945 in the same unit, 
where an officer of 77th regiment of anti-aircraft artillery of 4th Anti-aircraft Artillery Division: „(...)  intoxicated, 
he went to the soldier accommodation of his platoon, where he fall over [sic!] soldier's beds and vomiting, he 
soiled them”. Ibid. 
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1944.46 Other symptoms of breaching disciplinary rules were soldiers' freedom of wearing a uniform, 
petty thefts, fights, owning illegal guns, and also all types of lawless requisition performed on the 
civilians.  These were mostly bikes and household appliances that fell prey to soldiers, but the loot 
included also motorbikes and cars. Of course, it had negative repercussions in the society, destroying 
the image of the Polish army, which was supposed to be immaculate.47  
Elimination of this problem was not easy, and at that time perhaps even impossible. Such 
examples of breaching military discipline are abundant; what is more, they are reflected in source 
documents and orders of commanders of various ranks. They  show that it was a serious problem and 
there were attempts to deal with it using a system of punishments and rewards applied in the army. 
Discip linary practice in 4th Anti-aircraft Art illery Division shows that it was not an easy task. The 
number of punishments used in this squad as compared to the number of rewards in the reporting 
period of 1 June to 15 August 1945 was very high (419 punishments, 1077 rewards). 48 In most of the 
documents on military discipline, commanders express their rather sceptical op inions as if they did not 
believe that improvement was possible in those conditions. The level of d iscipline was also 
significantly influenced by establishing of the peer tribunals of privates of Polish Army or honour peer 
tribunals for non-commissioned and commissioned officers, which were to uphold discipline in their 
communit ies.49 It was a well-thought direction of bottom-up control of the military environment within 
separate personnel groups, yet it was not very effective. Thus, attempts to put this nat ional, cultural and 
social mixture together in a powerful monolith were not easy.  
Developed under the Soviet banner at the turn of 1944 and 1945, the Po lish Army concealed 
numerous organisational glitches in its structure.  Lack of proper logistic support in individual services 
was linked directly to the condition of the Polish state, its economic efficiency and lack of material 
support from the USSR. It was a grave problem for the military community, especially if we consider 
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 See: Ibid, Rozkaz Nr 14 z dnia 2 września 1944 r. NDWP, sygn. III-1-303, Rozkazy organizacyjne NDWP, k. 
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wydania nieczytelna, P.W.] Dowódcy 4. DAPlot w sprawie: o awanturach i rękoczynach szefa ruchomych 
warsztatów artyleryjskich dywizji, sygn. III-218-37, Rozkazy i zarządzenia dowództwa dywizji, k. 55 (Order No. 
061 [illegible date of issue, P.W.] of the Commander of the 4th Anti-aircraft Artillery Division concerning 
arguments and fights of the head of the division mobile artillery workshop, ref. III-218-37, Orders and regulations 
of the division command, c. 55). Also a non-commissioned officer of 77th regiment of anti-aircraft artillery 
committed fisticuffs against his subordinate and he also was demoted to a private. Ibid., Rozkaz Nr 0121 z dnia 7 
czerwca 1945 r. Dowódcy 4. DAPlot w sprawie niewłaściwego obchodzenia się przełożonych z podwładnymi,  
sygn. III-218-37, Rozkazy i zarządzenia dowództwa dywizji, k. 171 (Order No. 0121 of 7 June 1945 of the 
Commander of the 4th Anti-aircraft Artillery Division on superiors ' inappropriate dealing with subordinates,  
ref.III-218-37, Orders and regulations of the division command, c. 171) .  
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 Ibid., Rozkaz Nr 0227 z dnia 1 września 1945 r. Dowódcy 4. DAPlot, sygn. III-218-37, Rozkazy i zarządzenia 
dowództwa dywizji, k. 285 (Order No. 0227 of 1 September 1945 of the Commander of the 4th Anti-aircraft 
Artillery Division, ref. III-218-37, Orders and regulations of the division command, c. 285). 
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 The statute of tribunals (including the system of penalties used in corps) and more information on their 
operations in 4th Anti-aircraft Artillery Division Ibid. Statut oficerskich sądów honorowych, protokoły z zebrania 
podoficerów w sprawie wyboru sądu koleżeńskiego oraz meldunki o działalności sądów 24.10.1944-31.08.1945,  
sygn. III-218-65 (Statute of the honour officer tribunals, minutes of the meeting of non-commissioned officers on 
the election of peer tribunals and reports on tribunal operations 24.10.1944-31.08.1945, ref. III-218-65).  
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the provision of sanitary items, food and uniforms. On the other hand, lack of sufficiently educated 
officers, but also of non-commissioned officers, who generally presented poor (or no) leadership skills 
affected the state of alert and morale of the soldiers. We cannot disregard a po litical aspect here. The 
army was under strict supervision of the new communist authorities, who as it was mentioned in the 
introduction, served a foreign power which some soldiers did not intend to serve. That's where their 
attitude to military service and the Soviet uniform came from. Gaps in the officer corps, which were 
probably the key organisational problem of the WP, were filed by drafting pre-war officers or those 
who came from the AK and other independence organisations.50 Treated with deep distrust, they 
started to pose a serious problem to the Soviet principals at a later time.  
Another issue was that fact that many servicemen started their service in the army in the 
USSR (where they were held against their will) already in 1943; whereas joining th e army by 
Wasilewska and Berling was the only way to escape from this „inhuman land”. Many Poles, who had 
not managed to join the army formed under the command of general Władysław Anders (due to the 
operations of the USSR army and admin istration which tried to prevent citizens from getting into the 
areas where the units were organised) and then to evacuate with this army, took this opportunity.   
The limits of ideological freedom in the army were set by the scope of intervention in this 
freedom, which was carried out in a thoughtful and managed manner. The direct ive of the Main 
Political and Educational Board of the Polish Army specified clearly that: „(...) there is no room for 
any concessions to the AK (...) they have to break with their past, condemn it and separate from it (...), 
they have to understand that (...) they came to us from a grouping which carried out operations hostile 
[sic!] to Poland, whereas we represented and still represent (...) the Po lish reason of state. Supporters 
of the "neutral" or conciliatory attitude to the AK should be treated as the AK members unless they 
show in the near future that they actively fight the AK”.51 This stance was quickly toughened, what 
resulted in a wave of desertion in the revived WP.52 Persecutions of soldiers of independent descent 
were an everyday practice of this uneasy service, which was an intended element of sovietization of 
the Polish army.53 Repressions - as means of reprisal - and the staffing policy mentioned above were 
applied both in 8th Infantry Division as well as in the 4th Anti-aircraft Artillery Division and other 
units of the WP for many long months, until the army was „cleared” of the „reactionary element”. The 
climate in the army was getting worse and worse each month. The service atmosphere among soldiers 
was becoming more and more tense as a result of partitions between them. In this situation a mutiny in 
the army was quite likely, which the Soviet command, with Stalin at the top, were aware of, being 
afraid of losing control over a portion of the formed military units when the World War II finished. 
That is why an appropriate selection of commanding staff from the lowest to highest level was so 
important, at the same t ime ensuring a correct course of the process of political indoctrination o f the 
army. Therefore, the course of everyday service was not easy both in the conditions of the military  
operations of the World War II as well as in the later period, when the communist authorities sent 
regiments of the WP to fight the independence underground under the banner of democracy in the 
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Dekret Polskiego Komitetu Wyzwolenia Narodowego z dnia 23 września 1944 r.  Przepisy wprowadzające 
Kodeks Karny Wojska Polskiego, Dz.U. 1944 nr 6 poz. 28. 
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Summary: 
 Polish Army in its organisation phase on the turn of 1944 and 1945 illustrated with an example  
of 4th Anti-aircraft Artillery Division and 8th Infantry Division 
 
In 1944, in line with the prepared plans of the extension of the Polish Army, the following military units 
were formed already in the course of military actions of World War II in the Siedlce area: the 8th Infantry 
Division, the 4th Anti-aircraft Artillery Division and the 1st Independent Mortar Brigade. Totally, the headcount 
of the formed tactical detachment was supposed to reach 15 thousand soldiers.  
Numerous organisational and logistic glitches could be seen in the formation stage of the military units 
mentioned above. They affected the quality of military service, leading to relaxation in the ranks of the Polish 
Army. Hostility of many lower rank servicemen (but not only them) towards Soviet officers, who joined the newly 
organised Polish Army, was an additional factor which made this situation even worse. Raising this issue, the 
Author sets it in the context of political and social changes taking place in Poland after the Polish Committee for 
National Liberation was established. He also refers to military discipline, which remains one of the key threads of 
this paper, and which actually posed a serious problem to the General Command of the Polish Army. 
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